Ethical Considerations for the Justice
Department When It Switches Sides During
Litigation
I.

INTRODUCTION

A recent United States Supreme Court case, Washington v.
Seattle School DistrictNo. 1,1 ("Seattle School District")raises
serious ethical concerns regarding the propriety of a government
entity changing its position for political reasons during the
course of litigation. In this case, the United States repudiated its
position as coplaintiff/appellee in the lower courts and aligned
itself in the Supreme Court with the appellant State against its
former coplaintiffs. During the time involved between the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' and the switch in
sides, no new legislation or court decision had effected any
change in law. There was, however, a change in presidential
administrations, including a new Attorney General and a new
Solicitor General.' Following the realignment, the Supreme
Court denied a United States' motion for expanded time for oral
argument, but did allow the Justice Department to file a brief
supporting the State.4 The appellee school districts requested
that the Court disqualify the Justice Department as counsel for
the United States, and that the United States be denied party
status.6 The Court did not respond to these requests.
Because the current ABA Code of Professional Responsibility0 ("Code") rarely addresses the government attorney, the con1. 102 S. Ct. 3187 (1982).
2. 633 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980).
3. President Ronald Reagan, United States Attorney General William French
Smith, and Solicitor General Rex E. Lee.
4. The Solicitor General described the position of the United States as "an appellee
supporting the appellants." United States Motion to Expand the Time for Oral Argument and for Divided Argument at 1, Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 102 S.
Ct. 3187 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Motion].
5. Appellees' Response to Motion to Expand the Time for Oral Argument and for
Divided Argument, Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 102 S. Ct. 3187 (1982).
6. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY (1981) [hereinafter cited as CODE].
The American Bar Association promulgated the CODE in 1969. It has been adopted in
some form by all 50 states and the District of Columbia. See A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

28-29 (1976).
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duct of the Justice Department in this situation does not so
clearly deviate from the ethical standards of the Code. Yet, the
Department's reversal in position and its decision to litigate
against its former coparty violates the spirit of the Code and
presents the kind of behavior that undermines public confidence
in the justice system. The philosophy underlying the Code
allows for no distinctions among attorneys.7 Automatic withdrawal should be mandatory from cases in which a shift in political power compels the government to switch sides in a lawsuit.
This Comment briefly discusses the history of the case, and
then demonstrates the difficulties in applying the present Code
to certain ethical questions that can arise when the government
changes its allegiance in the midst of litigation. The ethical propriety of the Department of Justice's actions is examined, and
alternatives are proposed for situations in which the United
States, represented in court by the Justice Department, switches
sides in the same case.8
II.

WASHINGTON V. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT

No. 1

In late 1977, the Seattle School Board voluntarily adopted
the "Seattle Plan," a mandatory busing program designed to
reduce racial imbalance in the school system and avert
threatened legal action by various groups claiming unlawful segregation in Seattle.9 Shortly thereafter, a number of Seattle residents formed an organization called the Citizens for Voluntary
Integration Committee ("CiVIC"). CiVIC drafted statewide Initiative 350,1 tailored to eliminate mandatory busing for pur7. "Within the framework of fair trial, the Disciplinary Rules should be uniformly
applied to all lawyers, regardless of the nature of their professional activities." Id. at
Preliminary Statement (footnotes omitted).
8. This situation, as will be made clear in the body of the text, is completely unlike
a confession of error by the Solicitor General in a criminal case where the United States
is the sole party on one side. E.g., Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960) (per
curiam). In cases of that nature, the Government drops charges against the defendant,
and the matter is concluded. In Seattle School District, rather than simply withdraw
from the case, the United States reversed its position and turned its full power against
its former coparties.
9. In early 1977, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Association for

the Advancement of Colored People, and the Church Council of Greater Seattle had all
threatened legal action to force Seattle to desegregate its schools. Brief of Appellees at 3,
Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 102 S. Ct. 3187 (1982).
10. Initiative 350 (codifipd at WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.26.010 (1981)) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, after December 7, 1978, no
school board, school district, educational service district board, educational
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poses of racial integration.1 1 On November 8, 1978, the initiative
passed, supported by sixty-six percent of the vote. 1 2 Within a
month the Seattle School District, joined by the only two other
Washington school districts with comprehensive integration programs,"3 filed suit against the State in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington. The school districts challenged the constitutionality of the initiative under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and won
in both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals."
The United States intervened and obtained standing as a
party plaintiff in the district court in accordance with section
902 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. section 2000h-2.' 5
service district, or county committee, nor the superintendent of public instruction, nor the state board of education, nor any of their respective employees,
agents or delegates shall directly or indirectly require any student to attend a
school other than the school which is geographically nearest or next nearest the
student's place of residence within the school district of his or her residence
and which offers the course of study pursued by such student, except in the
following instances:
(1) If a student requires special education, care or guidance, he may be
assigned and transported to the school offering courses and facilities for such
special education, care or guidance;
(2) If there are health or safety hazards, either natural or man made, or
physical barriers or obstacles, either natural or man made, between the student's place of residence and the nearest or next nearest school; or
(3) If the school nearest or next nearest to his place of residence is unfit or
inadequate because of overcrowding, unsafe conditions or lack of physical
facilities.
11. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1 reserves to the people of the State the power to "propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the
legislature."
12. 102 S. Ct. at 3191.
13. Tacoma School District No. 10 and Pasco School District No. 1.
14. 473 F. Supp. 996 (W.D. Wash. 1979), 633 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980).
15. The statute provides:
Whenever an action has been commenced in any court of the United
States seeking relief from the denial of equal protection of the laws under the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution on account of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin, the Attorney General for or in the name of the United
States may intervene in such action upon timely application if the Attorney
General certifies that the case is of general public importance. In such an
action the United States shall be entitled to the same relief as if it had instituted the action.
42 U.S.C. § 2000H-2 (1976).
Before obtaining party status, the United States filed an amicus curiae brief in the
district court, ir which it reiterated the traditional stance of the United States and the
Justice Department in enforcing the rights of minorities under the Civil Rights Act:
In summary, the United States has a duty and obligation to insure that public
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As counsel for the United States, the Justice Department fully
participated in the lower court proceedings. Justice Department
attorneys examined and cross-examined witnesses, called witnesses, and briefed and argued the case on the merits. Furthermore, Justice Department attorneys participated in numerous
strategy councils with the other plaintiffs, and gained access to
the work product of other plaintiff's counsel.1 6
After the court of appeals' decision, the State petitioned the
Supreme Court for review. Prior to argument in the Court,
Washington State Attorney General Ken Eikenberry, representing the State, contacted several members of the new Reagan
administration, including United States Attorney General William French Smith.1 7 In his correspondence, Eikenberry
expressed his belief that the United States should not continue
to align its interests with those of the school districts. In a letter
to Lyn Nofziger, Assistant to the President for Political Affairs,
and Dick Richards, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, Eikenberry urged the administration to
. . . do whatever possible to make sure that the analysis of this
case and the decisions about the position of the United States
be made by personnel in the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department and in the Solicitor General's office who are
sympathetic to the policies and goals of President Reagan
rather than the administration of President Carter."
One month after receipt of this letter, the United States
school students are afforded equal educational opportunities. The voluntary
adoption of desegregation plans by local school districts aids the United States
in effectuating this enforcement responsibility. As such it is in the interest of
the United States to protect the ability of the plaintiff school districts to continue implementation of their desegregation plans.
Motion for leave to File Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5, Seattle School
Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 473 F. Supp. 996 (W.D. Wash. 1979).
16. Appellees American Civil Liberties Union of Washington. Objection to Motion
of the United States to Expand the Time for Oral Argument and for Divided Argument
at 4, Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 102 S. Ct. 3187 (1982).
17. Letter from Ken Eikenberry to Terrell Bell, Secretary of Education (April 16,
1981); letter from Ken Eikenberry to William French Smith (April 16, 1981); letter from
Ken Eikenberry to Edward Schmults, Deputy United States Attorney General (June 24,
1981 and August 4, 1981); letter from Ken Eikenberry to Lyn Nofziger, Assistant to the
President for Political Affairs, and Dick Richards, Chairman, Republican National Committee (August 4, 1981); memorandum from Lyn Nofziger to Ed Meese, Brad Reynolds,
Ed Schmults, and William French Smith (August 24, 1981) (all letters and memorandum
are on file in the office of the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
18. Letter from Ken Eikenberry to Lyn Nofziger and Dick Richards (August 4,
1981).
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repudiated its earlier position as coplaintiff to the school district. The Justice Department filed a brief on the merits as an
appellee supporting the appellant State, and also asked for
expanded time for oral argument. The Justice Department
attorney who had worked on the case since its inception was
removed from the case and the case file was given to another
attorney in the Appellate section of the Civil Rights Division.
The school districts filed briefs in opposition to the United
States' motion for expanded argument, and also asked the Court
to deny the United States party status in the case. m9 The Court
denied the motion for oral argument, but simply failed to
address the question of party status. Subsequently, the Court
upheld the position of the school districts and affirmed the lower
court decision."0
III.
A.

CANONS

4, 5, AND 9

Introductory Analysis

Traditionally, conflicts of interest and resulting attorney
disqualifications are dealt with under Canons 4, 5, and 9 of the
Code. 2 The Canons themselves are statements of "axiomatic
norms, expressing in general terms the standards of professional
conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the pub19. The school districts and other amici argued that the statute was intended to
allow the United States to intervene only as a plaintiff in civil rights actions. See supra
notes 5 & 16. The United States filed its brief as an "appellee supporting the appellant."
Motion, supra note 4. It did not attempt to reintervene as an appellant.
The language of the intervention statute, the stated intent of the provision, and its
traditional usage all seem to preclude intervention as a defendant, although that course
of action is not specifically denied in the statute. See supra note 15. See also H.R. REP.
No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWs 2391:
[Tihe Bill, as amended, is designed primarily to protect and provide more
effective means to enforce the civil rights of persons . . . [It] authorizes the
Attorney General to initiate suits and to desegregate public facilities. . . and
to intervene in suits charging equal protection of the laws.
Until this action, the United States had never used the statute to intervene as a defendant in a civil rights suit.
20. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Stevens joined. Justice Powell was joined in dissent by Justices
Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Chief Justice Burger.
21. Canon 4: "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client."
CODE, supra note 6, at Canon 4.
Canon 5: "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on
Behalf of a Client." Id. at Canon 5.
Canon 9: "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Impropriety." Id.
at Canon 9.
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Each
lic, with the legal system, and with the legal profession.
Canon is further divided into Ethical Considerations ("EC") and
Disciplinary Rules ("DR"). Ethical Considerations are merely
considered "aspirational," while Disciplinary Rules are
mandatory and state the "minimum level of conduct below
which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary
action." 2 s Although government attorneys are equally guided by
and subject to the provisions of the Code,2 the language appears
directed to lawyers involved in more traditional attorney-client
roles. Because of this emphasis on customary attorney-client
relationships, the provisions of the Code are often difficult to
apply in situations involving government attorneys.
DR 4-101(B), which prohibits a lawyer from revealing his
client's secrets, and DR 5-105(A), 6 which mandates that a lawyer decline employment likely to interfere with already existing
clients and interests, are the Disciplinary Rules most commonly
employed in conflicts of interest cases. Canon 9, which advises
against even the appearance of impropriety, is also used in this
area.
Canon 4 focuses primarily on cases in which an attorney
accepts employment against a former client. The purpose of the
Canon is to promote an attorney-client relationship of trust and
candor, public confidence in the legal profession, and an efficient
system of justice.2 7 Ethical deviations thereunder are measured
by determining whether the matters embraced by the adverse
representation are "substantially related"; if so, then there is an
irrebuttable presumption that confidences had been disclosed in

22. CODE, supra note 6, at Preliminary Statement.
23. Id.
24. See supra note 7.

25. The full text of DR 4-101(B) states:
Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a
third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
CODE, supra note 6, at DR 4-101(B) (footnotes omitted).

26. The full text of DR 5-105(A) states:
A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely
affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely
to involve him in representing different interests, except to the extent permit-

ted under DR 5-105(C).
Id. at DR 5-105(A) (footnotes omitted).
27. Id. at EC 4-1.
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the earlier representation. 2 The presumed disclosure of confidences coupled with the adverse representation violates DR 4101(B). Before the "substantial relationship" test is reached,
however, an attorney-client relationship must be shown to have
existed in the earlier representation. 9 Furthermore, the presumption of knowledge extends to all members of the firm of the
attorney who previously represented a now adverse client.8 0
Canon 5 concerns the duty of loyalty owed by an attorney to
his client. EC 5-1 states that the professional judgment of an
attorney should be exercised solely for the benefit of his client,
free of compromising loyalties and influences. Most conflict of
interest cases employing the Disciplinary Rules of Canon 5 arise
out of a concurrent representation by a lawyer or his firm of two
adverse clients.3 1 When the relationship between an attorney
and both clients is a continuing one, the adverse representation
is considered prima facie improper.3 2 The premise of this assertion is the oft-quoted biblical maxim that "no man can serve two
masters,"8 3 formalized in DR 5-105(A)."
Canon 9 reflects the bar's concern that an attorney's actions
may be misunderstood by the public, thereby eroding confidence
in the integrity of the legal profession. 0 The broad maxim of the
28. The "substantial relationship" test was devised in T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Although formulated under the
earlier Canons of Professional Ethics, the courts today continue to adhere to the test.
See, e.g., Heathcoat v. Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 532 F. Supp. 961, 964 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
29. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d
602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); Allegaert v. Perot, 434 F.
Supp. 790, 798 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 565 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1977).
30. See Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 385 (8th Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir.
1980); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 905 (1978); Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824, 827 (2d
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 392 (1956). The basis of this rule is that the lawyers
within a firm work so closely together, and access to files and work product is so readily
available, that the attorney might even inadvertently or subconsciously transmit confidences to other members of his or her firm. Recently, however, there has been some
movement away from the notion of an irrebuttable presumption of imputed knowledge.
See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir.
1975). See also Note, The Second Circuit and Attorney Disqualification-Silver
Chrysler Steers in a New Direction, 44 FORDHAM L. Ray. 130 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Silver Chrysler].
31. E.g., Cinema 5, Ltd. -v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976).
32. Id. at 1387.
33. Matthew 6:24.
34. See supra note 26.
35. CODE, supra note 6, at EC 9-2.
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Canon-avoiding the appearance of impropriety-is meant to be
followed when no other explicit ethical guidance exists; that is,
when no other disciplinary rule applies." Some courts have used
Canon 9 as the sole basis for attorney disqualification, even
when no clear wrongdoing occurred.3 7 Other courts require that
there be at least a "reasonable possibility that some specifically
identifiable impropriety did in fact occur."" The manner in
which Canon 9 should be applied is a matter of some
controversy. 9
B.

Canon 4 Analysis

As mentioned above, both DR 4-101(B) and DR 5-105(A)
are defined in terms of the traditional attorney-client relationship. Although at first that requisite relationship appears to
exist in Seattle School District, a closer examination reveals
that this may not be so. The apparent situation is analogous to a
firm (the Justice Department) corepresenting a client (the
school districts) in the district court and the court of appeals,
and suddenly, at the Supreme Court, withdrawing as counsel for
the first client to support the opposing client. Under a typical
Canon 4 analysis, because the subject matter is not only "substantially related" but in fact identical, there would be an
irrebuttable presumption that confidences were disclosed in the
earlier representation. 0 DR 4-101(B), prohibiting an attorney
from using a client's confidences to the client's disadvantage,
would apply. Furthermore, any confidences presumed to be
36. Id. John F. Sutton, who was reporter for the committee drafting the Code,
claims that some interpreters of Canon 9 have misunderstood the purpose of the Canon.
There is no rule stating that a lawyer should avoid the appearance of impropriety, rather
the Canon merely provides guidance concerning situations not addressed in the other
Canons. Sutton stressed that an attorney's duty to avoid the appearance of impropriety
was of a much lower order than other duties specified in the Code. AMsmucAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RSPoNsmLrr 398 (1979) (based on interview with John F. Sutton, Jr., by Olavi Maru, Director of Annotation Project, in Houston
(Dec. 20, 1976)).
37. See, e.g., Kessenich v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 684 F.2d 88, 99
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Arkansas v. Dean Food Prods. Co., Inc., 605 F.2d 380, 386 (8th Cir.
1979), overruled on other grounds, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 612 F.2d 377
(8th Cir. 1980); General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 641 (2d Cir.
1974).
38. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976).
39. See American Bar Foundation, Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility
400-11 (1979) for a good discussion of the problem.
40. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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within the knowledge of the attorney would be imputed to all
members of the firm."' In this case, attorney and firm disqualification would be mandated.
There are some awkward notions in the above analysis,
however. It is not so clear that the school districts were the clients of the Justice Department. The Department intervened and
acted as coplaintiff and participated in both trial and strategy
aspects of the proceedings; the Code, however, does not address
the relationship between coparties and their counsel. That the
United States helped represent the district's interests does not
necessarily constitute an attorney-client relationship, because
the relationship is undefined in the Code. Although the districts
did not engage the Justice Department as counsel in a typical
agency sense by employing the Department, there still was an
appearance of an attorney-client relationship; that appearance
should control the definition of "client" under the Code, and
trigger the application of DR 4-101(B).
An attorney-client relationship need not always arise in the
typical agency situation. The privilege of confidentiality between
an attorney and his client hinges upon the client's belief that he
is consulting a lawyer in that capacity. 42 Thus, information
exchanged between codefendants and their respective attorneys
in a criminal case has been held to be confidential; an attorney
later using that information against another of the codefendants
has breached his fiduciary duty.' Logically, the same reasoning
41. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
42. W. MCCORMICK & C. TILFORD, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF Evi-

DENCE 179 (2d ed. 1972). See also H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 106 (1953):
The spirit of this rule is to be observed rather than the letter, and where counsel is aware that confidence had been reposed in him by someone not his client,
but who has been assisting his client with information, he should not afterwards act against that person in any matter in which such information would
be material.
See also Note, Attorney's Conflict of Interests: Representation of Interests Adverse to
that of Former Client, 55 B.U.L. REv. 61, 66-68 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Conflict of Interests].
43. Wilson P. Abraham Const. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253 (5th
Cir. 1977). An attorney serving as cocounsel for plaintiff in this Louisiana case formerly
represented the Whitlow Steel Company. Whitlow had been a codefendant in an antitrust suit involving the present defendants, and a joint defense had been discussed in
that case. Furthermore, a civil suit was subsequently brought in Texas against the same
defendants while the attorney still represented Whitlow. The plaintiff's attorney in that
case was the other cocounsel for plaintiff in this suit, which defendants alleged was virtually identical to the Texas civil suit. The defendants moved to disqualify the attorney
who had earlier represented Whitlow. In remanding the case back to the district court
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should apply in a coplaintiff situation; yet, there is authority
suggesting otherwise.
In Black v. State of Missouri," a desegregation case in
which the court refused to disqualify a law firm, the district
court held that communications between codefendants or
coplaintiffs and their attorneys were not confidences or secrets
within the contemplation of Canon 4. 45 Black is easily distinguished, however. In that case, although the original coplaintiffs
were realigned, and an original coplaintiff was made a defendant, the party's interests remained the same. Furthermore, the
attorney targeted for disqualification-the plaintiff's attorney-had never had any direct contact with the attorney for the
other party, nor with the other party itself. Even the targeted
attorney's present clients were not the original parties to the
suit. The entire relationship between all parties and attorneys
was tenuous. In contrast to Black, however, the connection
between the districts and the Justice Department in Seattle

School District is substantial and immediate. The former

coplaintiff (the United States) and its law firm (the Justice
for specific factual findings, the court stated:
Just as an attorney would not be allowed to proceed against his former client
in a cause of action substantially related to the matters in which he previously
represented that client, an attorney should also not be allowed to proceed
against a co-defendant of a former client wherein the subject matter of the
present controversy is substantially related to the matters in which the attorney was previously involved, and wherein confidential exchanges of information took place between the various co-defendants in preparation of a joint
defense.
Id. See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Note, Conflict of Interests,supra note 33, at 6970.
44. 492 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1980). In Black, the plaintiffs, a school district and
minor school children, brought suit against various state and federal defendants claiming
that defendants were responsible for creating segregative conditions within the school
district. The federal district court judge determined that it was possible that the segregative conditions might have been caused by the plaintiff school district itself, so he
realigned the district as a party defendant. Because the parent next friends of the students were officers of the school district, they were replaced by other persons as next
friends. And because the attorney for the school district represented the children as well,
the court ordered that the plaintiff children obtain separate legal representation. However, new counsel for the children (who were later also replaced by new children) briefly
retained a professor of law to assist him in the suit. At no time was there any "employment" or "associate" relationship between the two attorneys. The professor, however,
had also served as an advisor to the school district while it was still a plaintiff. Because
of this relationship, the defendants filed a disqualification motion seeking removal of the
new plaintiff counsel.
45. Id. at 870.
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Department) took their files and supported the opposing party.
There was a sudden and unexpected shift in interest. The parties had worked closely together, and the information in the Justice Department's files had been obtained with the cooperation
of the school districts and their attorneys in the expectation that
the information would be used for the districts' benefit. Instead,
it was used against them.
Black notwithstanding, other indicia of the government's
position with respect to the school district favor the existence of
the attorney-client relationship in Seattle School District. An
ABA Opinion 46 states that a government lawyer assigned to
represent a litigant has an attorney-client relationship with the
litigant, and that the attorney's status as a government
employee does not excuse him from the requirement of preserving the client's confidences. The opinion further provides that
the obligation of confidentiality cannot be abrogated by the
attorney's superiors."7 Although the holding is persuasive, the
case is not factually similar to Seattle School District.The ABA
opinion dealt with a government lawyer directly representing a
government employee. The attorney's dilemma there concerned
a conflict between his client's confidences and the opposing
party's rights under the Freedom of Information Act. It does not
address the question of coparty and counsel relationships. Yet, it
clearly supports the proposition that when the government
chooses to represent a litigant it creates an attorney-client
relationship.
In general, discussions regarding who the government attorney actually represents generate several conclusions. Perhaps
this is owing to the nature of the Justice Department itself,
being both a political and legal arm of the Executive. 8 This
dichotomy is reflected in the United States Government Manual, where it is stated:
As the largest law firm in the Nation, the Department of Justice serves as counsel for its citizens. It represents them in
enforcing the law in the public interest ....
It represents the
government in legal matters generally, rendering legal advice
and opinions, upon request, to the President and to the heads
46. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1413
(1978).
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., L. HUSTON, A.S. MLLER, S. KRISLOV, R.G. DIXON, JR., RoLES OF THE
ATITORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 51 (1968) [hereinafter cited as L. HUSTON].
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of the executive departments."'
Other opinions identify the government's client as the govern51
ment itself;5 0 another asserts "the client is but an abstraction."
Given the amorphous role of the government attorney and the
Code's failure to define the term "client," confusion in this area
is understandable. Yet in Seattle School District the appearance
or image of the attorney-client relationship is conveyed not only
to the "client," but to the public as well. Although that relationship may not clearly exist, a policy of fairness alone should prevent the government from denying its existence, especially when
the relationship was relied upon by the school districts and cultivated by the Justice Department. Based on a Canon 4, DR 4101(B) analysis, the Department of Justice breached its fiduciary duty of confidentiality when it reversed its position in Seattle School District.
C.

Canon 5 Analysis

An examination of Canon 5 and DR 5-105(A)5 2 reveals similar language and definitional problems when applied to the
Department's conduct. The question is whether the Justice
Department, assuming that it represents the United States'
interest as well, can continue to represent the United States
against its former coparty and, arguably, client.
DR 5-105(A) requires that a lawyer decline "proffered
employment" if that employment will adversely affect an
already existing client's interests.5 8 Again, the rule does not
expressly address the government attorney's role at all. The Justice Department was not really employed by either the school
districts, or later, by the State. Yet the image presented to both
the client and the public is that of a government advocate repre49. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 330 (1982). See also Note, Conflict of
Interests, supra note 42, at 73, where the author states that it "is helpful to view the
public as the client of a government attorney," and Clark, Crisis of Justice, in R. NADER
& M. GREEN, VERDICTS ON LAwVERs 226-28 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Clark], where
former United States Attorney General Ramsey Clark asserts that the Justice Department "ultimately represents the public not the President."
50. Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional
Ethics, 70 HAnv. L. REV. 657 (1957). Judge Kaufman is inclined to view the government
as being both the client and the law firm of a government attorney. Id. at 665.
51. F. BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AuTHoRrT 97 (1962). Francis Biddle is a former Solicitor
General of the United States.
52. See supra note 26.
53. Id.
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senting both the districts' and the public's interest. Although
not necessarily "employment" in the traditional sense," certainly the Department's representation of both the school districts in the lower courts and of the State in the Supreme Court
fell within the meanings of the words and the general intentions
of the Disciplinary Rule. Policy considerations should have mandated government withdrawal from the suit, rather than support
of the opposing client.
The Second Circuit discussed those policy considerations in
Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc.55 There the court felt that at
least until the litigation ended, the client could depend on the
attorney's absolute loyalty as advocate and champion, and rely
on the attorney's "undivided allegience and faithful, devoted
service."" An ABA Formal Opinion,5 7 discussing DR 9-101(B),"
compares the policy considerations underlying Canons 5 and 9,
and speaks of the "treachery of switching sides."59
ABA Formal Opinion 7160 considered a "switching sides"

question similar to that in Seattle School District. Although the
opinion was formulated under the old Canons of Professional
Ethics, the ethical considerations involved in the cases are alike.
A city attorney undertook legal work in connection with a
municipal bond issue, including a successful validation suit. The
attorney was later asked by the City Commission, after a change
in personnel in the Commission, to attack the validity of the
bonds. The ABA Ethics Committee determined that it would be
unethical for the attorney to switch his position on the validity
of the bonds, despite the request by the Commission.1 The
Committee determined that such action would be unethical if
54. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARv 595 (2d ed. 1975) defines an

employee as "one who is hired by another. . . to work for wages or salary."
55. 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976). This case involved an attorney who was a partner
in two firms, one in Buffalo, New York, and the other in New York City. He found
himself in the position of having his Buffalo firm defending an earlier client against a
suit brought by a client of his New York City firm. Id. at 1385.
56. Id. at 1387 (quoting Von Molcke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725 (1948)).
57. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975).
58. DR 9-101(B) states: "A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter
in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee." CODE, supra
note 6, at DR 9-101(B).
59. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342, at 3.
60. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 71 (1932).
61. The Committee stated: "Having devoted himself and his professional efforts to
the preparation and validation of the bonds, the attorney cannot, with propriety, thereafter attempt to have them declared invalid ....
[Tihe change in personnel does not
release him from his professional obligations." Id.
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the attorney represented either the municipality or a private
taxpayer in advocating invalidity. Although in this case reversal
of position by the attorney might have resulted in financial
hardship to third parties uninvolved in the prior litigation,
which would not be the case in Seattle School District,the principle involved is the same. The government attorney in both
cases, with the approval of the current governmental administration, undertook to represent an issue in the public interest, and
was later asked to actively refute that position after a change in
administration. The ABA Ethics Committee in 1932 deemed
such action unethical.
As demonstrated with Canon 4, analysis of Canon 5 is difficult because of the vagueness of the Code's language. However,
6
the client in Seattle School District was no "abstraction.'
Whether that client was the public interest or the school district, the Justice Department bound itself to its initial position
by its advocacy of that position in the lower courts. The school
districts and those members of the public who believed their
interests were being served in the litigation were entitled to the
Department's "undivided allegience and faithful, devoted service,"" at least until the suit had ended.
D.

Canon 9 Analysis

Whereas the ambiguity of the Code in Canons 4 and 5 tends
to make their application difficult, the vagueness of Canon 9"
lends itself to a more flexible interpretation. Courts have
increasingly turned to Canon 9 as a source of attorney disqualification." Advising the "avoidance of the appearance of professional impropriety," it can be broadly applied without an actual
showing of wrongdoing by the attorney." It has been hailed as
62. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
63. See supra text accompanying note 56.
64. Canon 9 states: "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Impropriety."
CODE, supra note 6, at Canon 9.
65. See Kessenich v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 684 F.2d 88, 99 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 829 (11th Cir. 1982); Arkansas v. Dean
Food Prods. Co., Inc., 605 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980); Lee v. Todd, 555 F.
Supp. 628, 632 (W.D. Tenn. 1982).
66. See cases cited supra note 37. There has been much controversy over whether to
apply Canon 9 narrowly on the basis of its few Disciplinary Rules, or broadly and concomitantly with violations of other Disciplinary Rules (generally those under Canons 4
and 5). See ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 400-11 (1979).
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"all-inclusive, perfectionist, and unmerciful";6 7 it has been criti-

cized for these very same reasons.6 8 Opponents of Canon 9 find
it a dangerous weapon that tempts the "courts to apply it in an
unpredictable and sometimes bizarre manner.""
Those who support disqualifications based on Canon 9
argue that public trust must be preserved both in the administration of justice and in the integrity of the bar.70 These are significant considerations, even when measured against such countervailing factors as delays and increased expenses of justice,
denial of a client's counsel of choice, and possible disqualification of an attorney when there has been no actual wrongdoing.
The need for unqualified confidence in the legal system is essential. As stated in EC 9-1, "[clontinuation of the American concept that we are to be governed by rules of law requires that the
people have faith that justice can be obtained through our legal
system. '7 1' This admonition should be borne in mind before cautioning against an "excess of ethical fervor," as has one court. 2
Canon 9, lacking in compulsory, disciplinable rules, captures
within its broad mandate the essence and spirit of the Code: the
duty to uphold the integrity of the legal system. It should be
freely utilized to promote that goal.
67. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1304 (N.D. 11.
1977), rev'd sub nom., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
68. See, e.g., Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A Study of
the Federal JudicialProcess Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REv. 243 (1980); Note,
Silver Chrysler, supra note 30.
69. Kramer, supra note 68, at 264. Kramer seems to feel that the public's perception
of impropriety is not always accurate, and that the attorney's actions might in fact actually be "in the highest tradition of the bar: for example, representing unpopular clients,
defending the guilty, and being courteous to opposing counsel during the course of the
trial." Id. at 265. The author overstates his case, however. Those "highest traditions of
the bar" are not likely to cause most people to view the attorney's actions as involving an
impropriety. In conflict of interest situations, though, neither the professional nor the
public perspective is so penetrating as to always distinguish the fine line between what is
right and what is wrong.
70. See, e.g., Note, Ethical Considerations When an Attorney Opposes a Former
Client: The Need for a Realistic Application of Canon 9, 52 CHI-KENr L. REv. 525
(1975). See also Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975); Emle Industries,
Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973).
71. CODE, supra note 6, at EC 9-1. See also Erwin M. Jennings Co. v. Di Genova,
107 Conn. 491, 499, 141 A. 866, 868 (1928) where the court said: "Integrity is the very
breadth of justice. Confidence in our law, our courts, and in the administration of justice
is our supreme interest."
72. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 591
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
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That duty to maintain the integrity of the legal system
73
applies equally to government attorneys. Under Canon 9, the
shortcomings of the Code as applied to government attorneys
are not as apparent as they are under Canons 4 and 5.74 In fact,
the salvo of criticism hurled at the Canon focuses largely on the
7
vagueness of its language and its potential for abuse. Yet, it is
in situations where no clear violation has occurred, but where
the taint of abuse stains the proceedings, that Canon 9 is so
important.
Traditionally, courts employ Canon 9 in conjunction with
either Canon 4 or 5.76 Some courts, however, find the mere
appearance of impropriety sufficient to warrant an attorney's
disqualification, regardless of whether any actual violation is
found. 77 The controlling factor in these decisions is not whether
any violation occurred, but rather the potential adverse public
perception of the transaction, because the public "deals in
images and appearances. 7 8 As the Second Circuit observed in
Hull v. Celanese Corp.7 9 "the preservation of public trust both
in the scrupulous administration of justice and in the integrity
of the bar is paramount."8 0 The court, though recognizing other
factors, such as a client's right to counsel of choice and the consideration of judicial economy, held that those considerations
8
must ultimately yield to the integrity of the judicial process. "
Nowhere is the appearance of impropriety more sensitive an
73. See supra note 7.
74. In fact, DR 9-101(B), one of only three Disciplinary Rules concomitant with
Canon 9, is also one of the few Disciplinary Rules that deals specifically with the government attorney. CODE, supra note 6, at DR 9-101(B). It does not apply in the context of
this Comment, though. It is concerned, rather, with former government employees
involved in private employment related to their previous public employment.
75. See supra notes 68 & 70.
76. See, e.g., Schloetter v. Railoc of Indiana, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 709-13 (7th Cir.
1979); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1975); Emle Industries, Inc.
v. Patentex, Inc. 478 F.2d 562, 570-75 (2d Cir. 1973); Motor Mart, Inc. v. Saab Motors,
Inc. 359 F. Supp. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
77. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Dean Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1979), overruled
on other grounds, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 612 F. 2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980);
International Business Machines Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978); Canadian
Gulf Lines, Inc. v. Triton Int'l Carriers, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 691 (D. Conn. 1976).
In Canadian,for instance, an attorney was disqualified despite the judge's assertion
that there had been no actual wrongdoing. 434 F. Supp. at 696.
78. Arkansas v. Dean Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1979), overruled on other
grounds, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 612 F. 2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980).
79. 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975).
80. Id. at 572.

81. -d.
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area than in the workings of government. "Watergate" is now
the watchword for governmental impropriety. Most of the central characters in the Watergate affair were attorneys-and government attorneys.82 The "images and appearances" of Watergate are visions of a few government figures infusing politics into
the justice system.8 3
That is precisely the same image that is conveyed to the
public when the government switches sides in the middle of a
lawsuit, deserting its coparty and zealously advocating in one
court exactly the opposite of what it advocated in another." The
image perceived by the public is that of a "hired gun"-the lawyer working at the whim of a political administration, advocat82. Id. See Note, Removing Politics from the Justice Department: Constitutional
Problems with Institutional Reform, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 366 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as
Note, Justice Department] where the author states:
Except, perhaps, for the Presidency itself, no government institution suffered
greater dishonor from Watergate revelations than did the Justice Department.
The criminal conduct of incumbent and former Attorneys General, the early
mishandling of the Watergate investigation and discrediting testimony before
the Watergate committee-such factors produced a widespread perception that
politics and Justice had become intolerably intertwined.
Id.
83. In 1976 an American Bar Association Committee found that "[tihe close connection between partisan politics and the Office of Attorney General has seriously reduced
the effectiveness of the Department of Justice, inflamed fears about the integrity
of the
administration of justice, and created a substantial credibility gap in the minds
of the
public. Preventing Improper Influence on FederalLaw Enforcement Agencies. A
Report
of the American Bar Association Special Committee to Study Federal Law Enforcement Agencies 12 (1976). Former U.S. Attorney Whitney North Seymour is quoted
in
the above report as saying "[tihe divergent roles [of the Attorney General] of political
advisor and chief law enforcement officer must be definitely and sharply separated.
Until
they are, we will always be haunted by the possibility that the awesome powers
of the
nation's major law enforcement agency will be used for political purposes." Id. at 35-36.
84. The Justice Department, in its brief before the Ninth Circuit, asserted that the
"initiative is unconstitutional for three reasons: (1) it is overly inclusive because it
interferes with the constitutional obligations of school districts; (2) it creates a racial classification without a compelling state interest; and (3) it was adopted with an invidious
purpose." Brief for plaintiff-intervenors-appellees at 10-11, Seattle School Dist. No.
1 v.
Washington, 633 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980). Before the Supreme Court, the Department
took a different approach. It argued there that "[c]ontrary to the conclusion of the courts
below, it [the initiative] does not embody an explicit racial classification ....
[And]
although the district court found that Initiative 350 was unconstitutional because
it was
enacted for a discriminatory purpose and was overbroad, neither of these grounds
justifies invalidating the enactment." Brief for the United States at 12-14, Washington
v.
Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 102 S.Ct. 3187 (1982). A lawyer is certainly entitled to
advocate for either side, provided he does not breach any of the Disciplinary Rules of Canons
4 or 5 or assert a position in litigation that is frivolous. See generally CODE, supra
note 6,
at Canon 7. It is the switching of causes in "mid-stream" and deserting the former
coplaintiff that breeds the appearance of impropriety.
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ing without conviction whatever is the prevailing sentiment of
the prevailing administration."" Whether confidences are in fact
betrayed, the appearance of betrayal breeds public distrust of
the legal profession and of government ethics in particular.81
After Seattle School District,one must wonder whether communications between plaintiffs and government intervenors will be
as open as before, especially in civil rights suits under the present administration. Distrust between the two parties will result
in an impairment of the efficient administration of justice,
exactly the opposite of the ends sought by the Canons.
In Seattle School District, the breach of confidence seems
more jarring because it involves civil rights litigation.1 From the
time of the birth of the legislation in 1964, until the time of the
Justice Department's switch, the stated policy of the statute,
and its consistent application, was to enforce civil rights and to
8
aid in school desegregation." The school districts here had reason to trust and confide in the government attorneys. The government's decision to change its course was a political and not a
judicial decision and should have been made in a legislative or
administrative context. It would be naive, of course, to believe
that the Attorney General's position is free of political bias. The
Attorney General is a "political officer charged with legal
duties."'" But as the nation's ranking lawyer, he should be most
aware of the ethical responsibilities that are concomitant with
the job. For the Justice Department to change its stance and
switch sides in mid-litigation in light of the attendant circumstances appears suspect and unethical and should not have
occurred. The broad ethical command of Canon 9, despite the
absence of an appropriate Disciplinary Rule that specifically
applies here, should have been observed.
IV.

REMEDIES

There are two possible remedies available in situations simi85. See, e.g., Borden v. Borden, 277 A.2d 89 (D.C. 1971). Although the agency
the court
involved was a legal services group as opposed to the Justice Department,
stated:
refused to distinguish between the private and government attorneys. The court
government
that
appearance
the
give
would
that
action
any
"We should avoid always
Id. at 93.
attorneys are 'legal Hessians' hired 'to do a job' rather than attorneys at law."
83.
note
supra
86. See
87. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 19.
89. L. HUSTON, supra note 48, at 51 (emphasis in original).
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lar to the Seattle School District case. The best alternative is
for the government to completely withdraw from a case in these
situations. A change in the government's position in a suit,
absent a change in law or new facts coming to light, is based on
political considerations, not on the desire to pursue justice.
Actions of this kind undermine confidence not only in government, but in the ideals of justice.90 It wrongly intertwines the
workings of the legal system with the political system.91 It is
with this in mind that a former United States Attorney General
suggested a rule prohibiting the President or any member of the
White House staff from interfering in cases or matters in the
Department of Justice. 2 Others have long called out for a completely independent Justice Department, insulated from the
political control of the executive branch.93
The other alternative is attorney disqualification, which is
commonly employed by the courts. The court system may disqualify an attorney if it finds the attorney violated the Code." If
the Justice Department had been disqualified, the United States
would have been free to pursue its new position by appointing a
special prosecutor." This would have eliminated much of the
appearance of impropriety, and although the former coparty
would still have likely felt betrayed, disqualification probably
would have minimized feelings of unfairness. The government
would have withdrawn its support, but would not have been in a
position to impart information to the opponent. This procedure
might have meant a delay in litigation while the special prosecutor "reassembled" the case, but the integrity of the judicial process far outweighs that consideration."
90. ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159,
1218 (1958). Although this idea was expressed in the context of the government's duties
as prosecutor, it seems equally applicable in a civil context.
91. See Clark, supra note 49, at 226: "The Department of Justice is not part of a
political administration. It is place of law, enforcing the laws in accordance with the
purpose of Congress. ... It can only participate in the policy views of a President when
action is consistent with law, for it ultimately represents the public, not the President."
See also supra notes 82-83.
92. See Clark, supra note 49, at 226. The author is former Attorney General Ramsey

Clark.

93. For a good representation of those views, See Note, Justice Department,supra
note 82.
94. See, e.g., Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 859-60 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 543(a) (1976) provides that. "The Attorney General may appoint
attorneys to assist United States attorneys when the public interest requires."
96. For a case in which a court deemed that the work product of a disqualified
attorney was to be made available to substitute counsel, see First Wisconsin Mortgage
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CONCLUSION

The public recognizes the power of the government, and
must feel secure and protected against the arbitrary misuse of
that power. It must have confidence in the workings of the government, the legal system, and the legal profession. The government must recognize the "larger interest at stake, which may
warrant conceding a momentary advantage that would ' ' ultimately distort or retard the achievement of a greater goal." In
Seattle School District, that is precisely what the United States
did not do. In selecting its new course, the Justice Department
chose to betray coparties with which it had constructed a bond
of trust, thereby jeopardizing the public's confidence in the
administration of justice. In the future, should the government
decide to change its position in the midst of litigation in which it
is a party, it should be forced to withdraw from the case.
Clifford Freed

Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978). Judge Castle's well-reasoned dissenting opinion states that:
I believe the public would be at least disheartened by the knowledge that
although a lawyer who deserts a former client can be disqualified, the attorney
can still turn over all of his work to substitute counsel. Popular belief in the
strong fiduciary relationship between attorneys and their clients would
undoubtedly be shaken when the clients realized that the lawyer whom they
once took into their strictest confidence and in whom they placed ultimate
trust on the very matters at issue in the case is permitted to prepare the secret
materials which are now being used by the opposing party in the suit.
Id. at 220 (Castle, J., dissenting).
97. Griswold, The Office of the Solicitor General-Representing the Interests of
the United States Before the Supreme Court, 34 Mo. L. REv. 527, 527 (1969).

